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It has been said that 'the liberty of the subject is
secreted in the interstices of procedure'. In other
words, resounding proclamations about the rights and
freedoms of citizens are worthless unless procedures
exist that are known, accessible and affordable which
will enable the individual to exercise those rights
through due process of a court of law.
This dictum came sharply to mind a year ago when
reading an account of the speech which US Secretary
of the Treasury Nicholas Brady had given to a
conference of the Brookings Institution and the
Bretton Woods Committee in Washington on 10 March
1989. What struck us immediately about Secretary
Brady's proposals was the extent to which their
success or failure in achieving their declared object of
LDC debt reduction would depend upon the decisions
and actions of parties outside the US government's
control. Those decisions and actions by foreign and
US bank regulators, tax authorities, company
auditors and legal advisers will establish 'the
interstices of procedure' which must determine
whether individual banks in different jurisdictions will
or will not participate in Brady-type schemes in a
manner that would achieve Brady's declared objective.
One ofus predicted, based on a first tentative analysis,
that 'the Plan's early results will probably give rise to
frustration and disappointment' and 'the amount of
debt extinguished in exchange for their accepting new
obligations towards the World Bank and the IMF is
likely to seem to debtors disappointingly small')
It was that line of thought, namely that the success of
any scheme of debt reduction would depend upon an
accurate assessment of the reactions and initiatives of
many types of actors in the Third World debt drama,
that gave rise to the idea behind this Bulletin. The
Bulletin's purpose is to enable readers to learn
something of the considerations which will determine
how such actors are likely to respond not just to
Brady, but to other forms of debt reduction initiatives.
For that understanding to be complete, we have
thought it necessary to enable our contributors not
just to talk about their reaction to the Brady
proposals, but also to explain their perception of the
role of their own institutions and their interpretation
of what it was that gave rise to the problems of
This quotation is by Mike Faber from Success of Debt Plan is
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excessive LDC indebtedness in the first place.
Our scheme of presentation proceeds as follows:
We start with a general overview of the LDC debt
situation ('The Debt Crisis at the Turn of the Decade'
by John Williamson) and then follow it with a chapter
('Development vs Debt: Past and Future' by Richard
Portes) which both looks back to the repudiations of
the 1930's and forward to the effects changes in
Eastern Europe may have upon the position of Latin
American debtors in the 1990's.
Robert Devlin's chapter ('The Menu Approach')
traces the introduction of various forms of voluntary
debt reduction during the second phase of the Baker
Plan while the following chapter ('The Shaping of the
Brady Proposals' by Mike Faber) attempts to explain
how the Brady proposals evolved out of the widely
shared perception that the Baker Plan had simply run
out of credibility, and what the similarities and
differences are between the two approaches.
In Chapter Six the first three deals to give effect to the
Brady approach are analysed. The Mexican Finance
Minister, Pedro Aspe Armella, describes the Mexican
deal in terms that are markedly more positive than
those quoted later in this Bulletin from the McMahon-
Morse memorandum. Reginald Green assesses the
Philippine deal in the broader context of the country's
overall foreign exchange needs if target growth rates
are to be met. Stephany Griffith-Jones describes the
Costa Rica deal and readers may be tempted to
conclude that, in its way, it is the sweetest of the lot.
In the following two chapters Robert Russell ('The
New Roles and Facilities of the IMF') and Anthony
Toft ('The New Roles and Facilities of the World
Bank') explain the participation of their two
institutions in schemes of debt or debt service
reduction, but both do so in the broader context of the
full range of measures that the multilateral financial
institutions can employ to encourage policy reform
and to finance stabilisation, adjustment and
development.
Peter Mountfield's chapter ('The Paris Club and
African Debt') provides a historical account of hw
working procedures evolved, informally but very
effectively, in that very influential but still slightly
mysterious association of officials. 'English practices
run by Frenchmen' is how one diplomat has described
it.
Chapter Ten is made up of extracts which exhibit the
reactions of five prominent commercial bankers to the
choices which have been forced upon them since
March 1989. They are in some ways markedly
different, reflecting what are not only differences in
perception and interpretation of the current debt
situation but also differences in future intentions and
differences in the regulatory and tax regimes under
which they have to operate. The three British bankers,
Jolyon [.arkman (Barclays), Sir Kit McMahon
(Midland) and Sir Jeremy Morse (Lloyds) are a good
deal more critical of the Mulford/Brady proposals
than the North American, William Rhodes (Citicorp/
Citibank). The approach of the late Alfred Herrhausen
(Deutsche Bank) towards solving the Third World
debt crisis was by no means typical and he had the
advantage of speaking from what was at the time the
strongest and best provisioned of European banks.
We include his extract as a tribute to his imaginative
approach and as evidence that his assassination has
deprived the 1990's of a mind and personality that will
be badly missed.
The difference in approach betwen US and UK bank
regulators is, if anything, broader than the differences
between European and North American bankers.
Chapter Eleven exhibits this by contrasting an address
by Gerald Corrigan (New York Federal Reserve
Bank) with an analysis of the January 1990 version of
the Bank of England matrix by Stephany Griffith-
Jones. In the following chapter Mitchell Hogg ('Some
Accounting and Tax Aspects of LDC Debt') takes a
more detailed look at tax and provisioning require-
ments from the point of view of an accountant and
bank auditor.
In Chapter Thirteen, Gerald Breach ('The Role of
Export Credit Insurance') discusses the impact of the
debt crisis on Britain's ECGD and describes how
ECGD is responding to that situation. In Chapter
Fourteen, Masahiko Agata ('Japan's Attitude Towards
External Debts of Developing Countries') explains
how the Japanese Export-Import Bank is playing a far
greater role in facilitating schemes of debt reduction
than the bank's name itself might indicate.
Chapter Fifteen stands on its own. In it, a practitioner
and dealer, Gordon Wood, introduces us to the arcane
and somewhat unusual characteristics of 'The
Changing Secondary Market', a market whose size
and influence have grown and whose activities - at
least earlier in its life - were often resented by
respectable commercial bankers.
Our final two chapters are different in character again.
In Chapter Sixteen Stephany Griffith-Jones describes
how Midland Bank, UNICEF and the Sudan
Government put together a deal that produced 'Debt
Relief for Child Development'. In Chapter Seventeen
John Denham (War on Want) explains why non-
governmental organisations (NGO's) concerned with
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Third World development consider debt reduction to
be both just and necessary and describes a campaign
that is being prepared to expedite appropriate
measures of debt relief.
A word about the provenance of the articles we have
included in the Bulletin. Chapters 5 (Faber), 7 (Russell),
8 (Toft), 10(b) (Larkman), 13 (Breach) and 15 (Wood)
are derived from presentations made at a conference at
the London Press Centre on 25 and 26 October, 1989,
organised by International Business Communications
(IBC), and Chapter 12 (Hogg) has been updated from
a presentation to an earlier conference organised by
IBC. Chapters 3 (Portes), part of Chapter 6(a)(Aspe) and lO(a) (Rhodes) are derived from
presentations made at a conference at the Hyde Park
Sheraton, London on 22 and 23 February, 1990,
organised by the International Herald Tribune (IHT)
and the Inter-American Development (IADB).
We are grateful to International Business Communi-
cations, to the International Herald Tribune, to the
Inter-American Development Bank and to the
individual authors for permission to include these
pieces. Chapters 2 (Williamson), most of6 (Green and
Griffith-Jones), 14. (Agata) and 17 (Denham) were
written specifically for this Bulletin. Chapter 9
(Mountfield) is an updated version of a paper
originally presented at an IDS seminar, and Chapter 16
(Griffith-Jones) is an edited version of a paper
originally prepared for the Society for International
Development. The remaining extracts from
Chapters 10 and 11 are from papers which are in the
public domain but which are not readily accessible,
particularly to readers in Third World countries. It
was the chairman of the Treasury and Civil Service
Committee of the House of Commons (Terence
Higgins, MP) who not so long ago castigated
academics for not noticing how much valuable, up-to-
date data was being produced in evidence to
parliamentary select committees, and those of us who
took the hint must acknowledge that he was right.
In what follows we would like to pose some questions
about the objectives of the Brady proposals and about
their likely effectiveness.
We pose first the question of what should now be the
main objective of debt management? The main
objective of the Brady strategy must surely now be to
restore strong and sustained growth in the debtor
nations, so that the 1990's will not be another decade
lost to development. In this sense, those whose prime
concern is with development are bound to disagree
with those who still stress the restoration of
creditworthiness and the resumption of voluntary
bank lending as the major objective. The restoration
of debtors' creditworthiness may be an end in itself for
bankers, but for the populations of the indebted
countries it is only a means for achieving a greater end,
which is a lifting of the poverty in which so many are
condemned to live.
Except for special activities, such as trade or project
finance - it is now acknowledged that bank lending at
variable interest rates is not usually a good way to fund
development; nor does it seem likely that banks will
wish to return in the near future to new lending to
countries that have suffered debt crises. Because
genuinely new bank lending in the sense of providing
net additional resources on a large scale is neither
desirable nor likely as a major way to fund
development, significant debt reduction must play a
key role in reducing negative net transfers from
LDC's. Both editors have taken this line for several
years, when many still believed that the debt overhang
was merely a liquidity problem. Events have now led
many other analysts and policymakers to accept the
need for debt reduction.
But many who support the intention behind the Brady
initiative, and in particular its clear emphasis on
debt/debt service reduction as an important element,
are still worried that the resulting changes in financial
flows will be 'too little and for too few countries'. To
some there seems to be, within the Brady initiative,
acceptance of the principle of debt/debt service
reduction, but without the provision of sufficient
resources in place to allow sufficient restoration of
growth in indebted countries, as well as to provide
sufficient incentive for appropriate policies in these
countries.
In one sense, debt and debt service reduction is already
happening faster than the Brady Plan is being
implemented. In 1989, the majority of countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean were in arrears on
their commercial debt; these included several of the
largest debtors - such as Brazil, Venezuela,
Argentina and Peru, as well as most of the small
debtors, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay and Dominican Republic; amongst the large
or medium debtors, only Mexico, Chile and Colombia
were servicing their debt in full.2
As regards the particular mechanisms through which
the Brady proposals will actually be implemented,
those concerned with the restoration of development
will want to be satisfied on two issues.
1 Source: ECLAC Pce/mimare Oreri'ieir oft/ic lot/ii ,4mertcan 011(1
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First, is the use of public flows to achieve limited debt
reduction for a few countries through a comparatively
slow process, the best possible use of international
public funds? Might such funds not be better used to
achieve a lightening of the burden of debt owed to
governments? Might it not be the case that such
international funds could be more productively used
to finance neo' public lending either for investment in
new projects or to rehabilitate existing capacity?
Another of the assumptions on which the need to
provide public funding or guarantees for debt/debt
service reduction is based is the need (in the context of
the Brady proposals) for these operations to be
'voluntary'. The question arises whether this
'voluntary' element for the banks is compatible with
large enough debt reduction to ensure sustained
growth in LDCs? And is it either fair or sufficient to
require commercial banks to make sacrifices that will
get rid of the debt overhangs when comparatively little
is being done in that direction by either the bilateral
agencies or possibly even the multilateral financial
institutions?
As the Williamson article in this Bulletin suggests,
should not the export credit agencies of developed
countries be funded so as to allow them also to grant
some debt reduction, possibly an equivalent pro-
portion of the debt to what the banks will be granting
in debt relief?
Is enough being done to change banking and taxation
regulations, so as to encourage greater voluntary
debt/debt service reduction? Particularly in Europe
and Canada, why are tax incentives not modified so as
to encourage both banks' provisions (as at present)
and greater debt/debt service reduction?
Last, how can countries that have continued servicing
their debt regularly, and have pursued relatively more
prudent macro-economic policies than the rest of the
highly indebted countries, be enabled to share in
whatever benefits may follow from the implementation
of the Brady proposals? The highest prices on the
secondary market for debt in Latin America are those
prevailing for the debt of Chile, Uruguay and
Colombia; these are countries with relatively prudent
macro-economic policies and a continued record of
punctual debt servicing. If other countries are to be
encouraged to follow their example, is there not some
perversity in the sequence - the 'better' the
behaviour, the lower the discount, the less the benefit?
Should there perhaps be a supplementary to Brady to
reward the 'good performances'?
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